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INTRODUCTION

In our legal system, there are two jurisdictional keys required for access to
federal courts: personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Focusing only
on the latter component, one way that a litigant may satisfy subject matter
jurisdiction is by showing that there is complete diversity of citizenship between
the parties (i.e., that the parties are citizens of different states). When a lawsuit
arises between natural persons, courts simply determine the domicile of the parties
and then assess whether the parties are completely diverse under the federal rules;
however, when a lawsuit implicates artificial entities, courts apply varying rules to
determine the parties’ citizenships.1
There are three rules courts use to determine the citizenship of artificial
entities: two of them, applied to corporations and national banking associations
(NBAs), are statutorily prescribed by the legislature, and one is a judicial invention
that is applied to all other “unincorporated associations.” The rule used to
determine citizenship is significant because it dictates the number of states an
entity may be a citizen of, and this in turn regulates an entity’s access to the federal
forum, which has certain advantages for defendants (e.g., avoiding local prejudice).
To illustrate this point:
 an NBA is a citizen of one state (the state where its main office is
located);2
 a corporation may be a citizen of one or two states (the state of
incorporation and the state where it has its principal place of
business);3 and
 an unincorporated entity may be a citizen of one to fifty states and
the District of Columbia (according to the domicile of each
member).4
But how should the citizenship of foreign companies with substantial
domestic footprints be addressed? With globalization, foreign companies have
become an inextricable part of our world, and the line dividing their state of
citizenship is often blurred.5
Of course, once a court determines that a company is a foreign citizen (and
that the opposing party is a U.S. citizen), the court may then exercise alienage
diversity jurisdiction over the lawsuit, assuming all other jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied.6 However, the issue I will address in this Note arises
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (corporations); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185
(1990) (unincorporated associations); Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 747 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2014)
(national banking associations).
2. Rouse, 747 F.3d at 709.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
4. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 185.
5. See generally Amy L. Levinson, Developments in the Law—II. Developments in Diversity Jurisdiction,
37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407 (2004) (discussing recent developments in the area of diversity jurisdiction
that stemmed from globalization).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3) (2012).
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under the antecedent inquiry—whether that company is a foreign citizen at all. If
it is the case that the company is actually a U.S. citizen despite appearances that it
is a foreign citizen, subject matter jurisdiction may have been improperly
fabricated without true diversity of citizenship. To avoid this situation, courts
must resolve the rule for determining the citizenship of such foreign/domestic
companies.
In this Note, I will address one foreign company structure that has appeared
in federal courts with increasing frequency: the société à responsabilité limitée (SARL).
SARL (a.k.a. SÀRL, Sàrl, sàrl or S.à r.l.) is a type of private limited liability
corporate entity that exists in Lebanon, Macao, Algeria, France, Monaco,
Morocco, Tunisia, Madagascar, Switzerland, and Luxembourg—and it is most
comparable to an American LLC. A review of the case law reveals that courts
have been unable to establish a rule for determining the citizenship of SARLs:
some courts have applied the corporate-citizenship rule by itself, while others
have applied the corporate-citizenship rule in conjunction with the rule for
unincorporated associations.7 This is problematic when, for example, a defendant
claims diversity of citizenship as a SARL incorporated under the laws of France
and has its principal place of business in France. In such a situation, the defendant
may not be diverse under the rule for unincorporated associations because one of
its members is actually domiciled in the forum state, but a court may miss that
jurisdictional defect because it incorrectly analyzes the SARL solely under the
corporate-citizenship rule. Courts must establish a clear rule to remedy this
problem. Why? Because both Congress and federal courts have limited access to
the federal forum by allowing only corporations and NBAs to enjoy statutorily
prescribed rules that make them citizens of only one or two states; to allow
SARLs to claim the corporate-citizenship rule would undermine that effort.
This Note explains how courts should (or should not) analyze SARLs for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Case law reveals a strong principle against
application of the corporate-citizenship rule to noncorporate entities.8 Indeed, all
other unincorporated associations share a catchall rule and are deemed citizens of
every state in which their members are citizens, no matter how similar they may
be to a corporation in terms of structure.9 Therefore, the citizenship of a SARL
should be analyzed only as other unincorporated associations are analyzed—
according to the domicile of each of its members, without use of the corporatecitizenship rule.
I will begin by explaining the rules for determining the citizenship of

7. See V & M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 2010); Burge v. Sunrise
Medical (US) LLC, No. 13-cv-02215-PAB-MEH, 2013 WL 6467994 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013); Indus.
Fuel Co. v. Invista S.A.R.L., LLC, No. 5:06CV40-V, 2008 WL 619189 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2008).
8. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 188.
9. See id.; see also Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Determination of Citizenship of Unincorporated
Associations, for Federal Diversity of Citizenship Purposes, in Actions By or Against Such Associations, 14 A.L.R.
Fed. 849, 852 (1973).
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artificial entities in Part I. In that Part, I will also discuss the case law to highlight
the courts’ safeguarding of the two statutory rules for NBAs and corporations. In
Part II, I will discuss SARLs and the case law on the issue of their citizenship.
Finally, in Parts III and IV, I will explain why courts should apply only the rule for
unincorporated associations—and not the corporate-citizenship rule—when
determining the citizenship of SARLs for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
I.

RULES FOR DETERMINING CITIZENSHIP

Currently, there are three types of entities that have different rules for
determining citizenship: (1) corporations, (2) NBAs, and (3) unincorporated
associations. As the discussion below reveals, corporations and NBAs owe their
rules to legislative action, as courts have merely interpreted the governing statutes.
“Unincorporated associations,” on the other hand, share a catchall rule—created
by the courts—that applies broadly to entities that do not have a statutorily
assigned rule. This means that in the absence of legislative action, the catchall rule
should apply, regardless of how similar an entity may be to a corporation or an
NBA. I will briefly discuss these rules and return to some guiding principles
revealed by the case law in Part III.
A. Corporations
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) provides the rule for determining the citizenship of a
corporation. Section 1332 states that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of
the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . .”10 The
principal place of business is determined by the “nerve center,” or the place where
“a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s
activities.”11 Because of the explicit statutory language and the courts’ subsequent
interpretations of that language, it is well settled that a corporation is a citizen of
only two states: (1) the state of incorporation, and (2) the state where it has its
principal place of business12 (i.e., its “nerve center”). Notably, Congress created
the corporate-citizenship rule in an effort to shield the corporation from the
prejudice it may face as an outsider in state court.13

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
11. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010).
12. TM Mktg., Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assocs., L.P., 803 F. Supp. 944, 1000 (D.N.J. 1992) (“A
partnership is deemed to be a citizen of each state in which one of its partners is domiciled.” (first
citing Carden, 494 U.S. at 194–95); then citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,
456 (1900); then citing Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1137 n.11 (3d Cir. 1989); then citing
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1990); then citing McMoran Oil & Gas
Co. v. KN Energy, Inc., 907 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1990); and then citing 900 3rd Ave. Assocs. v.
Finkielstain, 758 F. Supp. 928, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))).
13. 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3611, at
469 (3d ed. 2009).
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B. National Banking Associations
28 U.S.C. § 1348 provides the rule for determining the citizenship of NBAs.
Under the statute, NBAs are “deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located.”14 The Supreme Court interpreted the term “located” to
mean that an NBA is a citizen of the state where it has its main office as set forth
in its articles of association (and not every state in which it operates branch
offices).15 Although the Court did not address whether NBAs would also be
citizens of the state in which they have their principal place of business, the Ninth
Circuit in Rouse v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, held that an NBA is deemed a citizen
only of the state in which its main office is located.16 Thus—at least in the Ninth
Circuit—an NBA is deemed a citizen of only one state. The Rouse court reached
this conclusion because “[t]he Supreme Court’s holding in Wachovia Bank was
largely reasoned from the conclusion that Congress intended to protect the right
of national banks to remove cases to federal courts,”17 and if it were to hold
otherwise, “the access of a [national] bank to a federal forum would be drastically
curtailed . . . .”18 Thus, in limiting an NBA’s citizenship to one state, the Rouse
court was giving deference to Congress’s intent to preserve an NBA’s ability to
remove its cases to the federal forum.
C. Unincorporated Associations
Unincorporated associations (or all other artificial entities), in contrast, share
a judicially created catchall rule and are deemed to be citizens of each state in
which any one of its partners, either general or limited, is domiciled.19 In crafting
this rule, courts reasoned that although corporations are deemed citizens for
purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, “unincorporated associations
remain mere collections of individuals.”20 Therefore, “[w]hen the ‘persons
composing such association’ sue in their collective name, they are the parties
whose citizenship determines the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court.”21
Accordingly, an unincorporated association may be a citizen of one, two, or even
fifty states—depending on the number of states in which its partners (general or
limited) are domiciled.22 This rule makes it difficult for a defendant to claim

14. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012).
15. Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 307 (2006).
16. Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 747 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 2014).
17. Id. at 711.
18. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 307).
19. TM Mktg., Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assocs., L.P., 803 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1992)
(citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1990)).
20. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980); see also Ferrell v. Express Check
Advance of SC LLC, 591 F.3d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 2010); Elston Inv., Ltd. v. David Altman Leasing
Corp., 731 F.2d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 1984).
21. Navarro Sav. Ass’n, 446 U.S. at 461.
22. See TM Mktg., 803 F. Supp. at 1000.
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diversity jurisdiction, since the more states in which a defendant is a citizen, the
greater the chances are that there will not be complete diversity.
Courts have extended this rule to limited liability companies, holding that,
though “LLCs resemble both partnerships and corporations[,] . . . every circuit
that has addressed the question treats them like partnerships for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.”23 Hence, the “citizenship of an unincorporated association
must be traced through each layer of the association, however many there may
be.”24 Courts have explained that “[t]his treatment accords with the Supreme
Court’s consistent refusal to extend the corporate-citizenship rule to noncorporate entities, including those that share some of the characteristics of
corporations.”25 Moreover, “[t]his treatment is also consistent with the common
law presumption that unincorporated associations are not legal entities
independent of their members.”26
As the foregoing discussion suggests, federal courts have declined to extend
the corporate-citizenship rule to noncorporate entities, even if such entities are
similar to corporations in terms of structure. Accordingly, as I will explain further
in Part III, the corporate-citizenship rule is incorrectly applied to SARLs for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
II. SARLS AND THEIR CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT
A. What is a SARL?
Put simply for purposes of this Note, a SARL is not the foreign equivalent
to a U.S. corporation. Rather, a SARL is a type of company that “has the
characteristics of a capital company (liability of the partners limited to the amount
of their contributions) as well as the characteristics of a partnership (nontransferable company shares).”27 A SARL is defined by statute, and its partners

23. Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (first citing
Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2004); then citing GMAC
Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2004); then
citing Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir.
2004); then citing Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000);
and then citing Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)).
24. Deep Marine Tech., Inc. v. Conmaco/Rector, L.P., 515 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (first citing Meyerson v. Harrah’s E. Chicago Casino, 299 F.3d 616, 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam); and then citing Kinder Morgan Liquids Terminals, LLC v. Ponns & Co., No. CIV. A H–06–
3225, 2006 WL 3691192, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2006)).
25. Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899 (first citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990);
and then citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1900)).
26. Id. (citing Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133 n.2 (9th Cir.
2002)).
27. Limited liability company (SARL), GUICHET.LU (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.guichet.public.lu/
entreprises/en/creation-developpement/forme-juridique/societe-capitaux/sarl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S2F8-7ZVD].
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have limited liability.28 It may have one partner, “but no more than fifty.”29 A
SARL provides for shareholder liability only up to the amount of the
shareholder’s contribution, and only a physical person may assume the
responsibilities of manager.30
Federal courts that have attempted to determine the citizenship of SARLs
thus far have found that a SARL is most similar to an American LLC.31 It should
then follow that SARLs should share the catchall rule for unincorporated
associations, which applies to American LLCs. However, because of the foreign
nature of SARLs, courts have expressed confusion as to which rule to apply for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction: the corporate-citizenship rule, the rule for
unincorporated associations, or both.
B. Current Legal Treatment
Federal courts in three seminal cases—Industrial Fuel Co. v. Invista S.A.R.L.,
LLC; V & M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp.; and Burge v. Sunrise Medical (US)—have
attempted to determine a rule to assess the citizenship of SARLs.32 These cases
constitute the primary body of law on the issue and reveal a potential problem
that arises in the absence of a clear rule for determining the citizenship of SARLs:
defendant companies attempting to gain access to the federal forum by fabricating
diversity jurisdiction. In Industrial Fuel Co., the magistrate judge recommended that
the citizenship of the SARL defendant be analyzed as both a corporation and as
an LLC, noting the absence of authority on the issue and the fact that a SARL is
most comparable to an American LLC.33 Subsequently, in V & M Star, the court
held “the citizenship of V & M’s ‘French S.A.R.L.’ is unclear for diversityjurisdiction purposes” and remanded the case to district court, ordering it to
determine the citizenship of the defendant and its “sub-members (and potential
sub-sub-members)”; however, the court did not explicitly state which rule the
district court should apply.34 And most recently in Burge, the district court—after
discussing V & M Star (noting that there is no controlling precedent on how to
determine the citizenship of a SARL) and Industrial Fuel Co. (noting the court’s
28. J. Christian Nahr, What Is a “Security” for Purposes of the U.S. Federal Securities Laws? An
Analysis of Foreign Equity Interests, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 723, 761 (2002).
29. Id.
30. RICHARD H. WEISE, The International Corporate Practice (Managing the “Mix”), in
REPRESENTING THE CORPORATION: STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COUNSEL 41 (2d ed. Supp. 2014).
31. See Indus. Fuel Co. v. Invista S.A.R.L., LLC, No. 5:06CV40-V, 2008 WL 619189, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2008) (“[T]he North Carolina Secretary of State’s office concluded that a S.A.R.L.
entity . . . was most comparable to a LLC . . . .”). The Sixth Circuit similarly found that a “SARL is the
French abbreviation for a term used to describe a private company similar to an American limited
liability company.” V & M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 924 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007)).
32. Burge v. Sunrise Medical (US) LLC, No. 13-cv-02215-PAB-MEH, 2013 WL 6467994 (D.
Colo. Dec. 9, 2013).
33. Indus. Fuel, 2008 WL 619189, at *3.
34. V & M Star, 596 F.3d at 356–57.
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analysis of the SARL both as a corporation and an LLC)—followed Industrial Fuel
Co. and held that both frameworks for determining citizenship should apply to
analyze the citizenship of defendant Sunrise Medical LLC, whose sole member
was Apollo BidCo SARL.35 After analyzing Apollo’s citizenship under both rules,
the Burge court found that there was no diversity: although the defendants
satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under the corporate-citizenship rule, they
“failed to show the citizenship of Apollo’s members and, as such, [did] not fully
[show] the citizenship of Sunrise” under the rule for unincorporated
associations.36 The fact that Apollo would be able to remove the case under the
corporate-citizenship rule but not under the rule for unincorporated associations
is unsurprising since the analysis under the corporate-citizenship rule is much
more forgiving than that under the rule for unincorporated associations.
In sum, the current case law teaches three things: (1) SARLs have been
deemed most comparable to the American LLC—and not the equivalent of a U.S.
corporation; (2) there is no clear rule for determining the citizenship of a SARL;
and (3) in the absence of a clear rule, some courts have applied the corporatecitizenship rule, the rule for unincorporated associations, or both rules, seemingly
just to cover their bases. But this lack of clear authority leads us to the heart of the
problem: by leaving the question of which rule a court should apply in
determining the citizenship of SARLs unanswered, federal courts are keeping the
door open for potential “gaming” of the rules for access to the federal forum.
C. The Problem: Potential for Gaming of the Federal Forum
Indeed, a careful analysis of these seminal cases reveals two commonalities
that suggest some defendants may be using SARLs to improperly fabricate
diversity jurisdiction. First, the party seeking access to the federal forum is the
defendant in the action; and second, the defendant self-selects the corporatecitizenship rule as the applicable rule without inquiry as to which rule should
apply. For instance, in Industrial Fuel Co., a SARL removed the action to federal
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, asserting it was “a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of the Country of Luxembourg, with its
principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas.”37 Similarly in V & M Star, the
defendant LLC merely stated in support of removal that its partners included one
“French S.A.R.L.”38 Finally, in Burge, the defendant asserted it was an LLC whose
“sole member is . . . [a SARL] incorporated in Luxembourg.”39 While the courts
and opposing parties in these three cases were particularly astute in noticing the
potential jurisdictional deficiency and tackled the problem head on, it is possible
that such jurisdictional defects go unnoticed more often than not given a SARL’s
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Burge, 2013 WL 6467994, at *2–3.
Id. at *3–4.
Indus. Fuel, 2008 WL 619189, at *1.
V & M Star, 596 F.3d at 356.
Burge, 2013 WL 6467994, at *1.
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foreign and unfamiliar nature. This is problematic because defendant companies
may be intentionally misrepresenting their nature as corporations to courts in
order to fabricate diversity jurisdiction. So why would a defendant do this, and
how?
Consider an extreme situation: a SARL (or an LLC whose sole member is a
SARL) may have members domiciled in fifty states. In that case, the company
would not be able to claim diversity jurisdiction in any state under the LLC rule,
but would be a citizen of only one or two states under the corporate-citizenship
rule. As one can imagine, the difference between being a citizen of fifty states—
versus one or two states—is astronomical for any defendant in terms of access to
federal court and the litigation advantages that follow.
A more likely situation is where a defendant company might have a member
domiciled in the forum state—thereby precluding access to federal courts under
diversity jurisdiction—and opts to proffer only its “state of incorporation” and
“principal place of business” as an LLC whose sole member is a SARL to skirt the
jurisdictional defect. This was the case in Burge, where the court found complete
diversity under the corporate-citizenship rule but found diversity jurisdiction
destroyed under the catchall rule for unincorporated associations.40 Had the court
not issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the action should not be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the case would have proceeded in federal
court without proper subject matter jurisdiction.
Ultimately, it is possible for defendants to enter the federal forum through
the back door by organizing as a SARL. Further, furtive defendants may organize
their company not as a SARL, but as an LLC whose sole member is a foreign
SARL—as was the case in V & M Star and Burge. This sort of pretense, whereby
companies create layers of sub- and sub-sub-members under the shell of a SARL,
makes it difficult for courts and opposing parties to discover the jurisdictional
defect because it appears the party has satisfied the rule for LLCs by proffering
the citizenship of each of its members. A more searching examination of the
members of the SARL—and not its alleged state of incorporation and principal
place of business—may, however, result in having the case remanded for lack of
diversity jurisdiction, as was the case in Burge.41
So how, then, should courts determine the citizenship of SARLs?
III. ESTABLISHING A RULE FOR SARLS
This Note aims to show that, according to the principles apparent in the case
law governing the three rules for citizenship, courts should not analyze a SARL as
both a corporation and an LLC; rather, SARLs should be analyzed only under the
catchall rule for unincorporated associations. There are two reasons for this. First,
28 U.S. Code § 1332 governs only “corporations,” and SARLs are neither
40.
41.

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
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corporations nor the foreign equivalent. Second, courts have thus accorded for all
other unincorporated associations—even those similar to corporations—the
catchall rule for determining citizenship, which I argue should be the rule applied
to SARLs.
A. Section 1332 Applies Only to Corporations
Section 1332’s corporate-citizenship rule applies solely to “corporations”
according to the statute’s language; because a SARL is not equivalent to an
American corporation, it should fail to qualify for the corporate-citizenship rule
under the applicable case law.42 Therefore, I will (1) show that § 1332 has been
applied only to corporations; (2) explain briefly, before I elaborate further on this
point in Part IV, what it means to be a “corporation”; and (3) show why SARLs
should not be deemed “corporations” under the meaning of § 1332.
1.

Courts Have Safeguarded § 1332 for Corporations

Case law teaches that courts have not extended the corporate-citizenship rule
to noncorporate entities, including those that share some of the characteristics of
corporations in deference to the legislature and the plain language of the statute.
This principle was aptly and conclusively explained by the court in Johnson v.
Columbia Properties Anchorage, where the court collected a plethora of cases
supporting the proposition that despite the LLCs’ corporate traits, “every circuit
that has addressed the question has treated them like partnerships for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.”43 Most importantly, the Johnson court explained that “[t]his
treatment accords with the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to extend the
corporate citizenship rule to non-corporate entities, including those that share
some of the characteristics of corporations[,]”44 and “is also consistent with the
common law presumption that unincorporated associations are not legal entities
independent of their members.”45 In essence, the Johnson court declared that under
Supreme Court precedent, all artificial entities—save for corporations (and NBAs,
both of which have statutory provisions that govern their citizenship)—fall under
the catchall rule since such an entity has not been granted citizenship by Congress
and remains a mere collection of citizens suing in their collective name.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held to this principle of safeguarding §
1332’s corporate-citizenship rule for over a century. This principle was articulated
42. See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006).
43. Id. (first citing Gen. Tech. Application, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir.
2004); then citing GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828-29
(8th Cir. 2004); then citing Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, LLC, 374 F.3d
1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004); then citing Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 48,
51 (2d Cir. 2000); and then citing Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)).
44. Id. (first citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990); and then citing Great
S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1900)).
45. Id. (citing Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133 n.2 (9th Cir.
2002)).
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as early as 1900 (prior to the codification of § 1332) in Great Southern Fire Proof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, where the Court dismissed a case for lack of diversity jurisdiction
because it refused to “hold that either a voluntary association of persons, or an
association into a body politic, created by law, is a citizen of a state within the
meaning of the Constitution.”46 The Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. Court
reasoned that the fact that a company is organized under the laws of a state does
not make it a citizen of that state; rather, it must be a corporation, and not merely a
“quasi corporation” having some of the characteristics of a corporation.47 And in
Carden v. Arkoma Associates, the Court held against the application of the
corporate-citizenship rule to noncorporate entities—and appeared to foreclose the
possibility of any more judicially created citizenship rules for artificial entities.48 In
finding that the parties lacked complete diversity, the Court held that a limited
partnership “may not be deemed a ‘citizen’ under the jurisdictional rule
established for corporations,”49 and cited to many cases to emphasize the point
that the Court has consistently refused to extend the corporate-citizenship rule to
“other artificial entities.”50 Carden explained that this principle holds true because
the question of whether artificial entities other than corporations should be
considered “citizens” for diversity jurisdiction purposes is one that is best left to
Congress to decide.51
Notably, the Carden Court avoided deciding how “corporation” should be
defined for purposes of § 1332 by simply excluding limited partnerships from the
scope of the statute. However, the fact that the Carden Court found that limited
partnerships do not qualify for § 1332’s corporate-citizenship rule—despite the
fact that they possess “some of the characteristics of a corporation”52—is telling
of the fact that the corporate threshold, if you will, that an entity must satisfy to
qualify for the citizenship rule may be quite high.53
In sum, Carden’s holding proclaims that courts will no longer legislate from
the bench on the issue of diversity citizenship, but rather defer to the legislature.
In the meantime, the Court will strictly limit application of the corporatecitizenship rule to “corporations.”

46. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co., 177 U.S. at 454–55, 458.
47. Id. at 456–57.
48. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).
49. Id. at 188.
50. See e.g., Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461–62, 461 n.7 (1980); Steelworkers v.
R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 151 (1965); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480–81
(1933); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co., 177 U.S. at 456–57; Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
51 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. at 196.
52. Id. at 189 (quoting Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co., 177 U.S. at 456)).
53. See id.
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Section 1332: Defining “Corporation”

Although courts have yet to resolve the definition of “corporation,” I will
attempt to define what a “corporation” is for the limited purpose of assessing
whether a SARL is a “corporation” per se under § 1332.
The legislative record of § 1332 shows that the problem courts face with
SARLs (i.e., possible gaming of the federal system) is not a new one. By 1958, the
year Congress added § 1332(c), the rule that a corporation is deemed a citizen of
the state in which it is incorporated was firmly established by case law.54
However, Congress enacted § 1332(c) to address an emerging problem:
corporations gaming the system—or “incorporation shopping”—by exploiting
the state-by-state inconsistencies in incorporation laws “by simply incorporating in
states in which they did no business, thereby guaranteeing their ability to remove
most suits to federal court.”55 By adding the “principal place of business” to the
corporate-citizenship test under § 1332(c), Congress intended to ensure that
federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction would not be restricted to those entities state
law decides to call “corporations” since such a bright-line rule would be to “[fuse]
simplicity of application with the important policy of prohibiting state interference
with federal diversity jurisdiction.”56 Accordingly, the legislative record suggests
that a corporation should not be defined under a plain language analysis (i.e.,
whether the name of the company includes the word “corporation,” or whether a
company meets the requirements for incorporation under state laws). However,
Congress has yet to define “corporation” for the purposes of § 1332(c), and there
is thus no clear directive on how to define a “corporation.” Some courts have
consequently wrestled with the task of defining what is required to be a
“corporation” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.57
However, case law provides some guiding principles that may be helpful.
The Supreme Court has maintained that “judicial extension of citizenship to
corporations was a unique occurrence and that all future extensions would require
congressional action.”58 Moreover, the Court in Carden opted not to define
“corporation” under § 1332 out of deference to Congress, instead holding
narrowly that a limited partnership does not qualify for the corporate-citizenship
rule under § 1332.59 Hence, the guiding principle from the case law is that courts
should read the diversity jurisdiction statute narrowly for artificial entities, because

54. Recent Case, Diversity Jurisdiction—Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C.,
385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1352–54 (2005) [hereinafter Diversity
Jurisdiction].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1352–53.
57. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir.
2004).
58. Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 54, at 1352.
59. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–97 (1990).
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“broadening its scope is a task ‘performed more legitimately by Congress than by
courts.’”60
The task of conclusively defining “corporation” for purposes of § 1332 is
thus best left for Congress (and is a task that cannot be performed in this Note);
however, I will return to address some obvious counterarguments that emerge
from this absence of a clear directive in Part IV—namely, where courts should
draw the line between being sufficiently corporation-like and not being enough.
But for now, I will explain why a SARL is not a “corporation” simply by virtue of
the fact that it is so unlike the U.S. public business corporation (hereinafter called
a “corporation per se”), which the Carden Court has arguably embraced as the
standard.
3.

A SARL Is Not a “Corporation” Per Se, but More Like an LLC

To show that a SARL should not qualify for the corporate-citizenship rule
under Carden and its progeny, we need only establish that a SARL is not, in fact, a
“corporation” per se in order for the catchall rule for all other unincorporated
associations to apply.
As an initial matter, an analysis of the company structure of a SARL reveals
that it is dissimilar to an American corporation. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
corporation as an entity
having authority under law to act as a single person distinct from the
shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist
indefinitely; a group or succession of persons established in accordance
with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has a legal personality
distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart
from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.61
This definition, coupled with the case law previously discussed, reveals that a
critical requirement needed for an entity to be deemed a corporation is that it
must have legal personality and power to act as a single, artificial “citizen” distinct
from the individuals who make up the entity. A SARL does not meet this
requirement. A SARL is an entity that is indistinct from the individuals who make
up the entity since it is statutorily defined as having nontransferable company
shares, which provides for shareholder liability up to the amount of the
shareholder’s contribution.
Furthermore, the fact that a SARL is not the equivalent of an American
corporation is discussed extensively by Professor Loftus E. Becker’s law review
article, The Société Anonyme and the Société à Responsabilité Limitée in France, which
distinguishes SARLs from the American corporation.62 In his article, Professor
Becker explains two types of entities: (1) the Société Anonyme (SA), the
60. Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 54, at 1352 (quoting Carden, 494 U.S. at 197).
61. Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.2014).
62. See Loftus E. Becker, The Société Anonymeand the Société à Responsabilité Limitée in France, 38
N.Y.U. L. REV. 835 (1963).
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counterpart under French law of an American corporation, and (2) the SARL,
which he explains “has no exact counterpart under American law.”63 I will use this
French paradigm to support my argument that a SARL—French or otherwise—is
not the foreign equivalent to the American corporation per se and is thus unable
to claim the corporate-citizenship rule.
Professor Becker explains that the “SA is the form of French enterprise
most comparable to that of a United States corporation[,]” and is “[u]tilized by the
more important French industrial and commercial enterprises[.]”64 The SA also
“possesses a prestige greater than that enjoyed by a SARL, which is particularly
suited for family-owned businesses and smaller enterprises desiring simplicity of
operation.”65 Thus, despite the greater complexity and the additional formalities
required to organize an SA, Professor Becker notes that U.S. investors who desire
to enter the French market in the most favorable atmosphere organize an SA
rather than a SARL;66 and of those who do opt to organize and operate a SARL
for simplicity’s sake, U.S. investors often grow frustrated when they are unable to
impose adequate controls and manage the SARL as one could according to U.S.
corporate practices.67 Given that a SARL’s characteristics differ so vastly from the
U.S. corporation, Professor Becker concludes that any American investor who
contemplates making a “substantial equity investment in France, who has a choice
as to the form of organization to be adopted under French law, should give
serious consideration to the creation of an SA, even though that form of
organization is more complex to organize and to operate.”68 Thus, Professor
Becker’s extensive survey of French corporate practices demonstrates that a SARL
is substantially dissimilar to an American corporation.
To further illustrate this point, I have included Table 1 below, highlighting
some key differences between a French SARL and an American corporation.
Table 1
American Corporation
There are five key legal characteristics
an American business corporation
must possess, two of which are:
 A (multiperson) board of
directors.69
 Fully transferable shares in

French SARL
In contrast, a SARL does not, as a
matter of law, possess several key
characteristics:
 A SARL can dispense with a
collective board in favor of a single,
general director or one-person

63. Id. at 836.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 839.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 889.
68. Id.
69. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? 13 (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for
Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy Research Paper No. 300, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=568623.
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This permits the company to make a
public offering of its shares and to
conduct business uninterruptedly as
the identities of its owners change.70
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board.71
 Shares are non-negotiable and are
not freely transferable to persons
who are not already shareholders in
the enterprise.
 Moreover, a SARL cannot make a
public offering of its shares.72

Given such differences, it is clear that a SARL is not the foreign equivalent
of an American corporation73—that would be the Société Anonyme, or SA.74 And
according to the guiding principles illustrated by the case law, whether a SARL is
most similar to an American LLC or a partnership is of no consequence because
both entities share the catchall rule.
B. The Catchall Rule Applies to All Other Unincorporated Associations
After Carden, it is established that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the
citizenship of artificial entities—except for corporations—must be that of its
individual members.75 This rule has been applied with respect to labor unions,
joint-stock associations, and insurance associations or exchanges, as well as to
various other kinds of unincorporated associations,76 including LLCs and
partnerships.77 The rationale behind this catchall rule is that in the absence of a
statute that provides otherwise (e.g., NBAs and corporations),78 the persons
composing such associations sue in their collective name; thus, they are the parties
whose citizenship determines the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court.79
Because Congress has not prescribed a citizenship rule for SARLs, the corporatecitizenship rule should not be extended to SARLs based on the parties’ allegations
merely for the sake of ease and simplicity. This is especially true because the
Carden Court solidified the principle that judicial extension of citizenship to
corporations was a unique occurrence and that all future extensions would require
congressional action, stating: “In other words, having entered the field of diversity
policy with regard to artificial entities once (and forcefully) in Letson, we have left
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Becker, supra note 62, at 880.
73. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 69, at 6 n.10.
74. See Becker, supra note 62, at 880 n.204.
75. Oglesby v. Cooper Mfg. Corp., 144 B.R. 700, 710 n.20 (E.D. La. 1992) (recognizing
Carden v. Arkoma Associates ’ s abrogation of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), where
the Court held that state law determined the citizenship of a foreign entity resembling the U.S.
corporation).
76. Jones, Jr., supra note 9, at 852.
77. See Deep Marine Tech., Inc. v. Conmaco/Rector, L.P., 515 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 (S.D.
Tex. 2007).
78. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990).
79. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980).
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further adjustments to be made by Congress.”80 If courts were to apply the
corporate-citizenship rule either by itself or in conjunction with the rule for
unincorporated associations, they would essentially be creating a new rule for
citizenship for SARLs—squarely against Supreme Court precedent.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that we need not rely on secondary
sources for the proposition that a SARL is not a foreign version of the American
corporation. As explained in the discussion above, federal courts have already
found that a SARL is not equivalent to the American corporation, but rather
similar to the American LLC. To restate the point, the court in Industrial Fuel
noted that the “North Carolina Secretary of State’s office concluded that a
S.A.R.L. entity created under Luxembourg’s laws was most comparable to a [sic]
LLC under North Carolina Law,”81 and the court in V & M Star stated that a
“SARL is the French abbreviation for a term used to describe a private company
similar to an American limited liability company.”82
Because primary sources of law already exist and support the proposition
that SARLs are not “corporations,” and since Congress has not acted to address
the citizenship of SARLs, courts should not apply the corporate-citizenship rule
when addressing SARLs. Whether the corporate-citizenship rule would apply to
SAs is a separate, more difficult issue not addressed in this Note.
IV. THE COUNTERARGUMENT: HOW, THEN, SHOULD “CORPORATION” BE
DEFINED FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, AND DOES THIS MATTER FOR SARLS ?
This Note has shown thus far that a SARL is not a corporation per se under
§ 1332. However, that was done by compiling primary and secondary sources in
which courts and experts had found that the SA is the foreign equivalent to an
American corporation and that a SARL—albeit without an equivalent U.S.
company structure—is most similar to an American LLC; it was not done by
defining “corporation” and showing how and why a SARL failed to meet that
criteria. This is partly because under the current case law, there is no settled
definition of “corporation.” Indeed, in holding that an LLC should be analyzed
under the catchall rule, the Carden Court did not touch on how a court should
determine whether an entity is a corporation; it merely held that LLCs should be
excluded from the scope of § 1332 by assuming that LLCs are not “corporations
per se.”83 This lack of a clear directive leaves open the possibility that if a SARL is
deemed to be most similar to some type of “corporation”—perhaps a
professional corporation (PC)—it may be entitled to application of the corporatecitizenship rule according to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Hoagland.
The Seventh Circuit in Hoagland—in finding that the corporate-citizenship
80. See Carden, 494 U.S. at 196–97.
81. Indus. Fuel Co. v. Invista S.A.R.L., LLC, 2008 WL 619189, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
82. V & M Star v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sloss v. Indus.
Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 924 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007)).
83. Carden, 494 U.S. at 189.
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rule applies to PCs—relied on the plain language of § 1332 to extend the
corporate-citizenship rule to “professional corporations” (based on the word
“corporation” being used for the business entity as defined by state law) with the
aim of reducing jurisdictional litigation.84 The Supreme Court has yet to comment
on Hoagland ’s plain language rule.
Because the Supreme Court has not defined “corporation” and has not yet
ruled on the Seventh Circuit’s plain meaning approach, we are left with two
possible approaches for determining the citizenship of SARLs: (A) under Supreme
Court precedent, courts should not apply the corporate-citizenship rule to any
entity that is not a corporation per se, including PCs and SARLs, until Congress
acts to define “corporation” under § 1332; or (B) according to the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Hoagland, courts should apply the corporate-citizenship rule to
any entity that is referred to as a “corporation” by state statutes, whether or not it
is a corporation per se, under a plain meaning analysis. If the Court were to adopt
the second, plain meaning rule, it would open the door for SARLs to make
jurisdictional arguments for application of the corporate-citizenship rule by virtue
of being similar to some sort of “corporation” as defined by certain state laws.
However, critics have argued that adopting the Seventh Circuit’s plain
meaning approach would be to “fuse[ ] simplicity of application with the
important policy of prohibiting state interference with federal diversity
jurisdiction.”85 Indeed, such reliance on plain meaning would improperly confer
federal jurisdictional policy to the states and lead to interstate confusion because
state laws are inconsistent in their requirements for incorporation.86 That result
would contradict the legislative intent behind § 1332 and inevitably lead to the
same state-by-state inconsistency that led to “incorporation-shopping” prior to
the 1958 addition of the principal place of business rule.87
The first approach can help avoid such issues. A rule that would limit
application of the corporate-citizenship rule to corporations per se (until Congress
acts) would not have this problem because business corporations—or what I have
referred to as corporations per se—are much more uniformly regulated than the
other types of corporations (like professional corporations) under state law.88
Indeed, critics of the Hoagland decision have commented that “[a] bright-line rule
limiting § 1332(c)’s applicability to business corporations would strike a feasible
balance between Judge Posner’s concern about minimizing jurisdictional litigation
and the principle that state law should not demarcate the reach of federal diversity
jurisdiction.”89 Furthermore, safeguarding the corporate-citizenship rule solely for
corporations per se would be in accordance with Supreme Court precedent as well
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004).
Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 54, at 1353.
Id. at 1350–53.
Id. at 1349–53.
Id. at 1353–54.
Id. at 1350–51.
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as the legislative intent behind § 1332—unlike the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
Hoagland. Accordingly, the term “corporation,” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
should be reserved for corporations per se, which would preclude private
corporations, “limited liability corporations,” and, of course, SARLs from its
scope.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion shows that the corporate-citizenship rule should
not be used in determining the citizenship of SARLs either by itself, or in
conjunction with another rule; to do so would be to legislate from the bench and
to create a new rule for citizenship, which the Supreme Court has proclaimed to
be an improper function for the judiciary. Indeed, noncorporate entities,90
regardless of any shared characteristics with corporations,91 should be subject to
the rule for unincorporated associations absent legislative action under Supreme
Court precedent. Because SARLs have been found by courts to be most similar to
the American LLC—and are certainly not the foreign equivalent of the American
corporation92—it follows that courts should apply only the catchall rule for
unincorporated associations, making SARLs a citizen of every state in which a
member is domiciled.93
By safeguarding the corporate-citizenship rule in this way, courts will be
giving due deference to the legislative intent behind § 1332, observing the longstanding common law principle that federal courts should not be in the business
of crafting new citizenship rules, and preventing improper fabrication of diversity
jurisdiction and access to the federal forum.

90. Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (first citing
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990); and then citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1900)).
91. Id.
92. See V & M Star v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Furthermore, the
citizenship of V & M’s ‘French S.A.R.L.’ is unclear for diversity-jurisdiction purposes. ‘SARL is the
French abbreviation for a term used to describe a private company similar to an American limited
liability company.’” (quoting Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 924 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007)));
Industrial Fuel Co., Inc. v. Invista S.A.R.L., LLC, 2008 WL 619189, at *1 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
93. See TM Mktg., Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assocs., L.P., 803 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1992).

